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What does the future hold for Generation Alpha?

November 15, 2017

Grant Thornton are running a series of breakfast talks on the Future, with speakers from Cranfield University. The first one recently was given by Joe Nellis, Professor of Global Economy on the future for Generation Alpha – ie the under 7’s and yet to be born, the next cohort following Generation Z, the 7 to 21 year olds.

Generation Z are facing a difficult financial situation, not of their making, with a concentration of wealth into the top 1% or fewer, increased parental dependency and increasingly likely to rent rather than buy their homes. They have less trust in institutions – politics, big business etc – and may be resentful of older generations for having left them in this position.

Joe warned us that nobody knows what the future will hold, but he identified a number of trends he saw continuing. Globally, Generation Alpha will be a smaller cohort because of falling birth rates, though increasing population will continue to put pressure on natural resources and raise issues of sustainability. So-called “Frontier economies”, a wave following today’s “developing economies” will emerge to become significant, and migration will continue to be a major pressure, with increased tensions in international relations. Urbanisation will also continue, with over half the world’s population living in cities.

Globally, Joe thought Generation Alpha would be richer than the previous generation as increased wealth was shared amongst a smaller cohort, but he had concerns about wealth inequality, as the owners of AI/robots took an increasing share. They will also be better educated, staying in education longer (Masters degrees as standard), becoming ever more specialist.  SAMI’s view had been of increasing wealth inequality within countries, but decreasing inequality between countries. This brings with it shifts in global power.

On the technology front, Joe expected to see virtually complete global connectivity (SAMI’s analysis challenges this idea because of the need for universal power supplies, which is a major issue), and continued development of AI and robotics into the 4th Industrial Revolution.

The word “digital”, as in “digital camera” will become redundant, as Alphas will never have known analogue technology. They will have short, 10-second, attention spans (“the age of impatience”), expect all services to be personalised, and challenge brands (and politics) to be more ethical.

In the world of work, they will be less loyal to one organisation, expecting work to be project based, more complex and with more choice. They will be more entrepreneurial and expect to make an impact. But they may also have to work longer, with more caring responsibilities as populations age.

Contrasted with Baby Boomers, Alphas will be visual rather than verbal; experiential in learning style rather than sitting and listening; operate collaboratively rather than in a command and control system; and value job flexibility over job security.

Responding to questions, Joe thought that Alphas would be less susceptible to fake news, as they would have the skills to challenge it better, and generally be more cynical about sources. There could be tensions between the hollowing out of work by AI, and demands for fairness and ethical behaviour. AI would also create new jobs – look at job ads today and you’ll many for “app developers” – a job that didn’t exist ten years ago.

And the basis of economic models could change, as GDP was no longer seen as a useful measure of society’s success –   Grant Thornton were already leading the way with the Vibrant Economy index, #vibranteconomy.

Joe’s slides are available on the Grant Thornton website.

It was interesting to compare Joe’s talk with the exercises SAMI has been doing with Grant Thornton, presenting drivers of change to various groups around the country as part of their Vibrant Economy programme.

Written by Huw Williams, SAMI Principal.

The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily of SAMI Consulting.

If you enjoyed this blog from SAMI Consulting, the home of scenario planning, please sign up for our monthly newsletter at eSAMIsignup@samiconsulting.co.uk and/or browse our website at http://www.samiconsulting.co.uk

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Ethical Reading

November 9, 2017

No, this is not about reading books on ethics but about an event hosted by an interesting new social enterprise based in Reading, Berkshire: the event was on 31st October.

Its roots can be traced back to Grant Thornton’s Future Perspectives project which SAMI Consulting helped them with. This led to the new CEO, Sacha Romanovitch, developing the Vibrant Economy England initiative. One of the local meetings Live Labs held to support this by bringing together local leaders was in Reading, and Jim Bignal took up the challenge to action, founding Ethical Reading.

The purpose of Ethical Reading is to help and encourage organisations and individuals to become more ethical in their behaviour with respect to society, organisations and the wider common good. In short, to make Reading a better place to live and work by encouraging this positive change.  The challenges of Reading – in terms of creating a diverse community with ethics spanning cultures – are a microcosm of the world today.

There are three core aims of Ethical Reading – to Inspire, Educate and Collaborate. To educate, we are working with universities, to collaborate we are working with local business. The event on 31st October is part of the Inspire stream – to provide a meet-up for people who believe that ethics is a key Factor in enabling 10bn of us to live on one planet.

I decided to accept Jim’s invitation to become a Director of Ethical Reading after working with Professor Paul Moxey – a SAMI Fellow – on the future of governance. As it became clear that culture was more important than regulation in creating an ethical working environment, and meeting the needs of real people, a forum for developing these ideas and facilitating their spread is clearly timely. In the longer term, we can envision an ecosystem of Ethical Cities globally.

On 31st October, Ethica hosted the first of a series of meet-ups, providing a forum for discussing current ethical issues and for people to find those of like mind at the Great Expectations Hotel in Reading from 6:30 to 8:30 pm. The topic was “Are CEOs paid too much” in conjunction with the Living Wage Foundation. Ethical Reading’s web site is at www.ethicalreading.org.uk

Written by Gill Ringland, SAMI Emeritus Fellow.

The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily of SAMI Consulting.

If you enjoyed this blog from SAMI Consulting, the home of scenario planning, please sign up for our monthly newsletter at eSAMIsignup@samiconsulting.co.uk and/or browse our website at http://www.samiconsulting.co.uk

“Britain in 2030: four post-Brexit scenarios”: conclusions and questions

November 1, 2017

Our publication of “Britain in 2030: four post-Brexit scenarios” came as the UK was well into its negotiations with the UK about the shape of the terms of disengagement. The Brexit process remains in as much flux today as it has done since its beginning. Two entirely different negotiating tactics, the Europeans approaching with clearly laid out, published and agreed positions shared amongst the 27 member states, and the UK with a more flexible yet secretive approach, have often led to public confusion at the direction of the talks. The marginal success of the Leave side has encouraged, rather than quashed, internal debate within the UK, and within its political parties. This debate continues, and the negotiations remain opaque to outsiders.

Our concern, however, is not with the terms of the final deal; it is with what the world will look like for the UK long after the disengagement has happened.

Our model opposed globalisation with localisation, and an economic focus with social cohesion, to produce a scenario set for modelling the future. In this piece, we review the implications of those scenarios for the UK itself.

SAMI Futures model

SAMI futures model

We offer no political opinions in this paper, nor do we attempt to predict a single outcome. What we have done is project a set of scenarios which encompasses the broad range of potential outcomes, and their implications. They will neither be as bad, nor as good, as their various supporters and opponents wish or expect. This is intentional – we are, as it were, operating at the centre of the Bell curve, not at its tails.Our UK-specific conclusions were as follows:

Global common approach

In this model, the UK would play an important part, since its constants of the English language, a trusted rules-based system, and an open, external focus would enable it to trade widely and smoothly. Negotiations with the EU would have resulted in a replicable model of frictionless trade, coupled with a movement of people almost identical to that prevailing before Brexit.

Pressure points would include aging populations in the west, encouraging immigration; the continuing rise in cyber crime as the world becomes more connected; and an increased focus on governance which may look like overheavy control on free enterprise.

Global competition

For the UK, being outside the EU forces it to engage, rapidly, with bilateral deals to maintain access to markets – and, importantly, access into the UK of the imports it needs to maintain the local standard of living. This world looks more ‘capitalist’, but for Britain, it should contain opportunities – though they will have to be fought for.

Localisation

The UK’s decision to leave the EU is less relevant than it at first appeared – the country becomes one amongst many, suffering as the EU’s cohesion diminishes but benefitting in its ability to be part of the prevalent bilateral agreement model. There is a distinct possibility that the Union will break down as the various constituent parts choose to go their own way.

Fragmentation and competition

For the UK, pinned between fortress Europe and an inward looking US, competing as a global player is difficult except in very specific areas – education, financial services, aviation and some specific high technology applications becomes key to the economy. Tourism is no longer about ‘cool Britannia’, but about the very thing Britain has in large quantities – history and tradition. Benefitting also from its language and still respected legal system, the “British model” of tight industrial focus, low tax and regulation, and determined international trade negotiations, becomes one other smaller countries work hard to replicate.

We have deliberately not included some elements which readers may expect to see in mid-term scenarios. The most obvious is climate change, and the associated impact of food and water insecurity, with their potential for migration and conflict. This is because it is not currently our view that climate change will have a magnitude-level impact within the period under discussion. Were we to extend the scenarios out to 2050, we would want to include it.

Our model worlds have many commonalities starting with a crisis which provokes significant change. We have not specified that crisis – it could be Brexit, it could equally well be a financial crash. The fact that it provokes change is what is important.

We do believe that developments in biotechnology and solar power fit within our end-date. The current development paths, especially in China and south-east Asia but also across the developed world, imply that there should be considerable impact from both.

Our divergences stem in the main from the axes we have chosen. These seem to us to be the most clear in the world as it is, and certainly those reflected most clearly in the political landscape within the UK and the world after the Brexit vote. Other oppositions would lead to other conclusions – there may be, particularly, value in this time span in considering international negotiation/militarism and wealth/poverty.

All four scenarios offer challenges. What the set shows, though, is that all routes also offer opportunities, even if some of them may seem to be somewhat disguised at present. We do not project likelihoods for any of the scenarios – they are tools for thinking and planning, rather than an attempt to confidently predict a specific future – and we encourage you to think about questions, and implications, for each one. We look forward to your views.

Written by Jonathan Blanchard Smith, SAMI Fellow.

The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily of SAMI Consulting.

If you enjoyed this blog from SAMI Consulting, the home of scenario planning, please sign up for our monthly newsletter at eSAMIsignup@samiconsulting.co.uk and/or browse our website at http://www.samiconsulting.co.uk

Could 2018 Be The Next “Year of Revolutions”?

October 25, 2017

David Lye, Director and Fellow of SAMI, looks at the historical precedents and the drivers that might lead to a “year of revolutions”.

When Revolutions Happen….

They tend to happen in clusters. The French Revolution of 1789 inspired radicals across Europe. In 1830, revolutions in Belgium and France helped to inspire uprisings in Switzerland, Poland and Italy. In 1848, revolutions in Sicily and France led to uprisings across Europe: Austria and its Habsburg dominions, the German states, the Italian states, Denmark and the Netherlands. The Russian Revolution 0f 1917 both inspired revolutionary movements from Europe to Outer Mongolia. 1968 saw protests in the USA, France, Northern Ireland, Mexico, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia, as well as Chairman Mao’s cultural Revolution against his own Government in China. 1989 saw protests in Poland spread to Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania, all inspired in part by the student uprising in Beijing. In 2010/11, the death of a young man in Tunisia triggered uprisings in that country, and in Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain, as well as large protests in a number of other Islamic countries.

Revolutions do not always succeed, and even when they manage to usurp the existing power structures, they do not necessarily resolve the problems that caused them. The uprisings in 1989 were directed against the regimes created by previous revolutions. And in 1848, the French people ejected the monarchy that itself had been installed after a revolution only 18 years previously.

For the purposes of this blog, the term revolution includes both completed revolutions, and major uprisings, which may not succeed.

Why Revolutions Happen

The demand for political change becomes revolutionary when those demanding change feel the “push” factor of intolerable circumstances, and the “pull” factor of a combination of a sense of their own strength, and of the decadence and weakness of the powers that be.

The push factors can be economic – desperation due to famine and economic depression across Europe was one cause of the 1848 revolutions, and economic problems helped to drive the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe and the Arab Spring.

A desire for self-determination, allied to a lack of identification with the ruling powers is often a factor. The revolutions in Belgium and Poland in 1830, and across Germany, Italy and the Habsburg dominions in 1848 were strongly nationalistic in many places, as were the 1989 uprisings against the USSR.

The generation gap is often a factor, as it was in China in both the Cultural Revolution and the Beijing spring, and in the USA and Paris in 1968, where young people, students and the urban poor, fought against what they saw as a corrupt, out-of-touch and elderly elite.

External influences can also have an effect. In the febrile atmosphere of a revolutionary “zeitgeist”, these influences tend to be greater.

Drivers of Revolution Today

In the West, Governments failed to foresee the Financial Crash, and the recovery from it has been weak or, in some places, non-existent.   But a very narrow elite has prospered, while a much wider section of the population struggles to find and hold on to work, and to maintain its standard of living.

In Europe there are regions demanding autonomy within nations, and tensions between some nation states and the EU. Mass-migration (or perhaps more accurately, the fear of it) has added to these tensions in many places. In the USA there is increasing polarisation, with the white working class, urban minority ethnic populations, and the educated young all feeling different forms of alienation and disconnection from the rulers and the big corporations.

Even Russia, which projects strength beyond its borders, suffers from a weakening economy and disaffection among its educated young people, with street protests taking place for the first time for several years. Rapid population growth in Africa will unleash social and economic tensions. There is plenty of unfinished business in the Islamic world, and South America too faces uncertainty and social, political and economic pressures.

Throughout the world, the increasing access to instant news and social media around the world increases the pace at which uprisings can gather support and momentum.

The 4th Industrial Revolution – even if its long-term effects are beneficial, as we hope – will create extra instability and jeopardy for workers in the short-term, and might very well increase the concentration of wealth into fewer hands. The use of quantitative easing to stave off a repeat of the Great Depression may have been partially successful, but leaves the global economy and the economic powers with unprecedented levels of peacetime debt.

The Revolution Starts Here?

The push factors are in place – economic precariousness, desire for self-determination and nationalist movements, a generation gap in terms of wealth and expectations. The years since the Financial Crash have seen the rise of outsider politics – the Occupy Movement, individuals such as Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn, new parties such as Syriza, Podemos, Cinque Stelle, and, most spectacularly, election winners: Donald Trump and Emmanuel Macron. There has also been a rise in nationalism – with nationalist parties taking a growing share of the vote in almost every European Country, and independence movements in Scotland, Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia, Corsica and Flanders – there is even an embryonic Californian secessionist movement: a response to Donald Trump’s winning of the Presidency.

If the pull factors apply: if the powers that be are incapable of restoring a sense of economic and social security, and the outsider politicians are seen also to fail to provide solutions, and the protest movements continue, what then?

As good futurists we deal in scenarios and ranges of possibility, NOT predictions, and this blog is not a forecast. But if 2018 joined 1830, 1848, 1968, 1989 and 2011 on the list of years of global uprisings, it would not be a huge surprise. The news reports and coverage on social media of the events in Catalonia this month may be a portent of things to come.

Written by David Lye, SAMI Fellow.

The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily of SAMI Consulting.

If you enjoyed this blog from SAMI Consulting, the home of scenario planning, please sign up for our monthly newsletter at eSAMIsignup@samiconsulting.co.uk and/or browse our website at http://www.samiconsulting.co.uk

“Britain in 2030: four post-Brexit scenarios”: the localisation scenarios

October 18, 2017

This is the third of a series of four blogs springing out of our scenario set on Britain in 2030. Our first blog dealt with some aspects of the model; we then addressed the two ‘global’ scenarios, and this one deals with the ‘local’ ones.

SAMI Futures model

In our last blog we said, “It is not the role of foresight to be political; it is our role to envision options and possibilities which provide frames for thinking about the future world.” We know that our scenarios will be interpreted politically – indeed, the previous blogs have been – but it is important to note, again, that we do not make political judgements in scenario planning: we look at the impacts of the political judgements which others make. Scenarios, particularly ones based as this set is, on balanced axes, have the advantage that they reflect all sides of a position in broad. Whilst there will inevitably be other factors in play, including Taleb’s ‘black swans’, axis based modelling at least allows for an examination of a position in the round.

The globalisation scenarios in the previous blog looked at developments of the world as it currently is: aspects of a globalised world where globalisation itself can take two divergent paths. The localisation models assume that that path is, essentially, rejected because of our projected near term “global crisis”, and the world order develops along more fractured lines.

Our “localisation” scenario prefers social cohesion over competition in a patchwork world. Globally engaged players become more inward looking – and especially we see the US giving up its role as global policeman – and migration barriers increase. Trade and other international agreements are built around a patchwork of one-to-one bilateral agreements. In particular, this affects those issues where wide international agreement is necessary to keep a policy effective: climate change would be the greatest impact here as international climate agreements become more difficult to sustain.

Social cohesion improves: communities of interest and civil society generally gets a big boost, as people look to use technology to develop alternatives to big corporations, take ownership of their own data and develop alternative currencies. Society becomes more diffuse in the absence of strong central governments and companies but it also becomes more bonded across interest groups. Entrepreneurs can gain economic and political power, though there is a tendency to prevent it from being centralised in too few hands – something replicated in governments, as some states fragment into their smaller constituent parts.

The UK’s decision to leave the EU is less relevant than it at first appeared – the country becomes one amongst many, suffering as the EU’s cohesion diminishes but benefitting in its ability to be part of the prevalent bilateral agreement model. There is a distinct possibility that the Union will break down as the various constituent parts choose to go their own way.

When we move from the social focus to an economic one (the scenario called “Fragmentation and competition”), we see a number of differences. Europe maintains coherence at its core, but it is the coherence of a fortress. Borders are tight. Competitive advantage is all; competition from low-wage economies continues to drive down real wages in advanced economies, but also promotes the development of new technologies – which are closely protected by patent barriers.

The impact of our postulated crisis leads people to draw different lessons. Competing systems with different tolerances for threats such as systemic collapse and cyber-attack avoid the risk that centralised economic and political systems can collapse, but those competing systems compete with each other for advantage. This is not just financial; corporations increasingly want to be in low tax communities with low legislative burdens, so governments respond by lowering corporation taxes, and loosening laws on the protection of workforce rights. The impact on tax revenues affects states’ ability to deliver on the “cradle to grave” welfare system. Automation lowers costs, but drives people out of work, and internal cohesion suffers, though the grey economy provides an element of informal employment. Migration of the highly skilled becomes easier; of the lower-skilled more difficult.

Trade is the tool for diplomacy; trading blocs with large consumer bases and substantial low cost manufacturing, such as China and India, are confident players on the world stage. Smaller countries focus on a narrow range of specialisms.

For the UK, pinned between fortress Europe and an inward looking US, competing as a global player is difficult except in very specific areas – education, financial services, aviation and some specific high technology applications becomes key to the economy. Tourism is no longer about ‘cool Britannia’, but the “heritage theme park” of history and tradition. Benefitting also from its language and still respected legal system, the “British model” of tight industrial focus, low tax and regulation, and determined international trade negotiations, becomes one other smaller countries work hard to replicate.

The localised world is “harder” than the globalised one. The liberal mantras of the post-war settlement have broken down, and the world is more competitive, less cooperative and in many ways harsher. But there are places in it for countries to succeed – though whether those countries are all the ones we are currently used to is somewhat moot.

Our final blog in this series will seek to draw some conclusions – common themes, and common differences, and try to draw together what the world, specifically for the UK, will look like in 2030.

Written by Jonathan Blanchard Smith, SAMI Associate.

The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily of SAMI Consulting.

If you enjoyed this blog from SAMI Consulting, the home of scenario planning, please sign up for our monthly newsletter at eSAMIsignup@samiconsulting.co.uk and/or browse our website at http://www.samiconsulting.co.uk

“Britain in 2030: Four Scenarios for post-Brexit Britain”: the global scenarios

October 11, 2017

This is the second of a series of four blogs springing out of the work we did to produce our scenario set on Britain in 2030. Our first blog dealt with some aspects of the model; this one will address the two ‘global’ scenarios, to be followed by one addressing the ‘local’ scenarios. We’ll follow it up with a set of conclusions.

SAMI Futures model

It is not the role of foresight to be political; it is our role to envision options and possibilities which provide frames for thinking about the future world. Political in any case is subject to any number of interpretations, and operates in the widest number of public spaces. Whilst, therefore, the UK’s decision to leave is a political one, and the response to it will be framed in a political context, the impacts of that decision will be in real-world effects which can be imagined and assessed. It is important to note that we do not make political judgements in scenario planning: we look at the impacts of the political judgements which others make.

Since the global models share the assumption that the current pattern of national engagement remains essentially focused on world trade, and the continuation of a global political outlook by the major powers and international bodies, the key distinction is between a synergistic and competitive approach to that global outlook.

The ‘global common approach’ quadrant is a development of the post-financial crisis, pre-Brexit world. It is convenient to think of it as international cooperation with a dash of the Olympic spirit: peoples working in harmony for a common aim and with common ideals. That implies a strengthening of international bodies – the UN, the EU – and of links across those bodies. Global governance improves, and governments work with each other in a spirit of mutual support. We would anticipate a growth in economic and social development; shocks to the world financial system would be smoothed out, and liberal values of equality and access to employment would continue to increase. The corollary is that free movement of people and capital would also be improved.

In this model, the UK would play an important part, since its constants of the English language, a trusted rules-based system, and an open, external focus would enable it to trade widely and smoothly. Negotiations with the EU would have resulted in a replicable model of frictionless trade, coupled with a movement of people almost identical to that prevailing before Brexit.

Pressure points would include aging populations in the west, encouraging immigration; the continuing rise in cyber crime as the world becomes more connected; and an increased focus on governance which may look like overheavy control on free enterprise.

The ‘global competitive’ approach is very different: against the Olympics, we have the international football competitions – teams of people competing against each other to gain and maintain dominant positions with little co-operation between the teams except in agreeing the basic rules of the game.

The international cooperative structure is therefore predominantly governed by an interlocking and frequently changing series of bilateral agreements, where nations attempt to gain the best possible deal for themselves, not for the community in large. Stresses and strains inevitably build up along the fault lines of those agreements. Migration is now based on national advantage – those people who have skills are in demand; those who do not have the skills needed by one nation or other are excluded.

Existing federal structures, especially Europe – and in this model we imagine that Scandinavia develops in its own way – become fortresses, both economically and in reality. Such matters as cyber security become more important as standards (and hence the ability to defend against attack) are regionalized. The desire for competitive advantage reintroduces subsidies for industry and technology development, and tariff barriers become significant. Developing countries would be locked out of the profitable markets behind these walls, though this may lead them into more effective regional alliances to develop the scale they need to be able to compete on the world stage.

For the UK, being outside the EU forces it to engage, rapidly, with bilateral deals to maintain access to markets – and, importantly, access into the UK of the imports it needs to maintain the local standard of living. This world looks more ‘capitalist’, but for Britain, it should contain opportunities – though they will have to be fought for.

Our next blog looks at what happens in a world where localization, not globalization, is dominant; one in which our scenarios look very different.

Written by Jonathan Blanchard Smith, SAMI Associate.

The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily of SAMI Consulting.

If you enjoyed this blog from SAMI Consulting, the home of scenario planning, please sign up for our monthly newsletter at eSAMIsignup@samiconsulting.co.uk and/or browse our website at http://www.samiconsulting.co.uk

 

“Britain in 2030: Scenarios for post-Brexit Britain”

October 5, 2017

For party conference season, SAMI has produced “Britain in 2030: Four Scenarios for post-Brexit Britain”. Conscious that much of the conversation around the UK leaving the European Union is inevitably influenced by the various political positions of both sides, we wanted to allow policymakers to have an apolitical space in which to consider the possible futures for the country.

The UK does not operate in isolation, of course, so we were concerned with outlining some versions of what the world itself looked like, to provide context for the UK’s future. We will be covering this piece of work in this blog and the three following. This blog covers the methodology we used; the next one the two options best described as ‘globalisation, then ‘localisation’, and finally we will draw out some conclusions from the whole exercise.

A scenario is not a forecast: it is a tool for thinking, an assembly of evidence and imagination, projected forwards to enable anticipatory thinking and planning. Scenarios tend to avoid wide variations from the path as visible from the now, so we regret that we do not anticipate, for instance, radical variations from a reasonably wide cone of possibilities.

Scenario vs forecast

After some consideration we chose two axes to build up a model for our scenarios. Whilst of course there are many factors in the decision to leave the EU, we chose what seemed to us to be two clear contradictions: the drive to globalisation (open borders and international organisations) compared to the desire for localisation (closed borders and bilateral trade deals); and the increasing debate between the free market, economically focussed approach on the one side compared to the social cohesion approach on the other – essentially, neo-liberalism versus the Podemos approach. This gives us four distinct quadrants, allowing us to develop scenarios for each.

SAMI Futures model

As we work through them, it will be clear that there are some recurring elements – and some which do not appear at all. Most obviously, this is a scenario set for 2030, and we have therefore not included climate change to any significant degree – the consensus is that this horizon is too short for major effects. We have, though, assumed a crisis of one sort or another in the near-medium term, though we have not specified it: it may be Brexit in itself; it may equally be another financial crisis or a geopolitical event. We have also assumed that the continuing development in biotechnology will continue, though we have located this development in Asia, partly to avoid it contaminating the model for UK and Europe.

Our next blog will examine the two quadrants above the horizontal axis – Global competition; and the Global common approach. We welcome your thoughts and comments.

Written by Jonathan Blanchard Smith, SAMI Associate.

The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily of SAMI Consulting.

If you enjoyed this blog from SAMI Consulting, the home of scenario planning, please sign up for our monthly newsletter at eSAMIsignup@samiconsulting.co.uk and/or browse our website at http://www.samiconsulting.co.uk

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